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Abstract
Many computer-based authentication schemata are based on pass-
words. Logging on a computer, reading email, accessing content on a
web server are all examples of applications where the identification
of the user is usually accomplished matching the data provided by
the user with data known by the application.
Such a widespread approach relies on some assumptions, whose
satisfaction is of foremost importance to guarantee the robustness of
the solution. Some of these assumptions, like having a “secure” chan-
nel to transmit data, or having sound algorithms to check the correct-
ness of the data, are not addressed by this paper. We will focus on
two simple issues: the problem of using adequate passwords and the
problem of managing passwords.
The proposed solution, the pathword, is a method that guarantees:
• that the passwords generated with the help of a pathword are
adequate (i.e. that they are not easy to guess),
• that managing pathwords is more user friendly than managing
passwords and that pathwords are less amenable to problems
typical of passwords.
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1 Passwords: they are useful only if they
are robust
Assume to have a service S which must be accessed only by trusted
users. The authentication of a user U is accomplished by having U to
provide for an identity (usually a user name u) and for a secret password
p. The secret must be known only to U , to S and to no other and it
must match the secret that the service already know.
This schema allows S to check that a user U ′, faking for U , is not
the intended user, since U ′, by definition, is not able to provide to S
the p that is linked to u. As usual, we assume that the identities are
publicly known, or that an attacker can easily discover them, and that
all that must be kept secret are indeed the passwords.
Since p is known only to U , this system is robust only if the fol-
lowing assumptions hold:
1. p is not “easy” to guess — we will make clear the exact formal
meaning of “easy” in a moment,
2. U has a simple and friendly way of managing its own many p,
corresponding to its many identities in its many services, oth-
erwise U can be tempted to write them down somewhere, or to
use “simple” p that are amenable of being stolen or guessed.
Of course, the above list is not complete, since in a real-world case
there can be many other issues to be considered, depending on the
technology, on the relevance of the accessed services or on the partic-
ular characteristics of the interaction between U and S.
From now on, when we talk about services, we assume them to
be like those mentioned in the introduction (terminal login, access to
email or to web-based applications, and so on), where an actor has to
provide its own data to a computer program, through a keyboard
or any other similar device: this range of services, far from being
complete, is of great relevance to the daily practices of many Inter-
net users.
1.1 Easy passwords are an hard problem
What is an “easy” password in the sense of item 1 above ? It is a secret
that is not so difficult to discover.
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Assume, without loss of generality, that p is simply a word in the
full language A∗ of an alphabet A. If we know that p is of length
n, then there are |A|n possible guesses for p. This means, that, if p is
randomly chosen, and there are no biases, the probability of guessing
it is only |A|−n and that there need approximately |A|n/2 attempts to
guess it. We associate to each service S a time frame TS that measures
how long it takes, on average, to guess one p for S, and we say that
that p is adequate for S when the estimated time to guess is greater
that TS . A p which is not adequate, is easy.
Of course, in a perfect world, TS would be infinite, but this re-
quirement is clearly impossible. For example, if we take A as the bi-
nary alphabet {0, 1}, TS as one year, and we assume that an attacker
can check by brute force 106 passwords each second, we have that an
adequate pmust be strictly more that 46 bits long since:
245 > 106(pwd/sec)∗3600(sec/hour) ∗24(hour/day) ∗365(day/year)
If we assume that the attacker gets stronger or weaker computa-
tional power, the estimate changes consequently.
Forty-six bits of password are not too many: they are guaranteed
by a 7 letter random string chosen from the ASCII alphabet (which
has 27 characters in it). In practice, we already face a problem, since
a randomly chosen word in ASCII7 can be very hard to remember
and technically very hard to type on an ordinary keyboard, due to
the presence of codes that are interpreted as control characters. If we
stick to a more ordinary alphabet of 16 letters, like the hexadecimal
code, we need a twelve letter password (which really is 48 bits long):
it surely is simpler to write (since we have only ten digits and the
letters A, B, C, D, E and F) but it can be even harder to remember.
Please try to remember this string, you will be asked about it later:
AC43 A172 E1CB 879D
Rememberingmany different passwords is a heavy burden, recog-
nised by many researchers. Many security practices (see [1] and [3],
for example) warn against writing down complex or long passwords,
since this helps potential attackers. On the other side, the same prac-
tices advise against using commonwords or strings that have amean-
ing since this makes the passwords amenable to dictionary attacks. In
both cases it is entirely a user problem to manage their (many) pass-
words in order to fulfil security requirements and to be able to use
the same passwords efficiently. In is reported in [2] (pages 104 - 105)
that “. . . entropy (. . . ) of standard English at less than 1.3 bits per char-
acters; passwords have less than 4 bits of entropy per character”, as
opposed to the theoretical 8 bits of entropy of an ASCII character.
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2 A simple solution: write them down
Some solutions to the above conundrum have been proposed, like
having external tokens or devices that provide the secret that uniquely
identifies the user, or using helper programs that store securely the
passwords.
In the following we will propose an alternate schema, called path-
words, which we believe is:
• secure (i.e. it allows the management of adequate passwords),
• user friendly (i.e. it is easy to devise helper applications, to re-
member and use passwords, and so on).
The following example explains the idea behind the pathword ap-
proach.
a c e 2 3 4
a 1 6 f 7 2
d 2 a 1 9 4
f c f a 9 6
e 1 b 5 b c
8 7 3 4 d 9
Figure 1: First example
How easier is an attacker job if we state that our own secret pass-
word is stored in the diagram of picture 1 ? By “stored” wemean that
we are able to read it out from the picture, with no other help.
Quick, now: which was the secret hexadecimal word of the pre-
vious section ? Have you been able to remember it correctly ? If the
answer is yes, congratulations for your memory, otherwise the fol-
lowing hint may be useful.
a1 c2 e 2 34 43
a5 16 6 f 78 27
d 2 a 1 9 4
f c f a 9 6
e9 110 b 5 b12 c11
8
13
7
14
3 4 d16 915
Figure 2: Annotated example
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Figure 3: Path example
The numbers appearing at the exponent of some letters indicate
the order to follow to read out the secret word: first the letter a, then
c, and so on, ending with 9 and d. Another picture shows even more
clearly the pattern followed to read out the password.
It is our position that remembering patterns (or paths) like those
depicted in picture 3 is easier than remembering passwords, that this
practice leads people to use stronger passwords and that no security
is lost in the process. By “security”, here, we mean that the practice of
remembering passwordswith the help of patterns like those sketched
above does not help an attacker significantly.
3 Analysing pathwords
Informally, a pathword pi is any walk on the cells of a table like that
previously depicted. Formally, a pathword pi is a function between
elements of some space S (in the previous example, S is the space
of 6x6 matrices over the hexadecimal code alphabet) to the strings
over another alphabet. For the sake of simplicity, and with no loss of
generality, we assume that the two alphabets are always the same. It
is easier to represent pathwords with diagrams like those of figure
3, but any other representation is obviously equivalent. For example,
the transformation given by figure 3 is
pi({ai,j |1 ≤ i, j ≤ 6}) = a1,1a1,2a1,6a1,5a2,1 . . . a5,5a6,1a6,2a6,6a6,5
Some key points to be considered are the following:
• users should have more than one pathword, perhaps a least
three or four, perhaps clustered around different security con-
cerns (for example, an “easy” pathword like the one above to
read out password to access less important services, another
one for more important services and a more complex one to
read out password of really sensitive services),
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• the diagrams themselves can even be public, since they convey
no useful information to potential attackers (see about this in
section 3.1),
• users should not try to make their passwords easier to remem-
ber or to build them following rules: in fact doing this will lower
the effective complexity of the password, making it easier to
guess.
The key question to be answered is: “Assuming the adoption of
a pathword, does this undermine the security of the identification
process ? If not, under which further assumptions ?” The remaining
of the paper is devoted to examining this question.
3.1 Robustness of pathwords vs passwords
Let’s define as d any diagram (for example a table) on an alphabet A.
Then a pathword is a function pi : d −→ p which maps d to a p in A∗.
Given a length n, the probability of guessing a random string in An
is |A|−n. If d contains only a subset A′ of letters, and pi does not have
repetitions (i.e. it never passes twice on any cell), then the number of
possible sequences is lower-bounded by
n∏
j=1
(|A′| − (j − 1))
Since we have no constrains on d, other than the usability of the
proposed solution, we can declare that the process of generating d is
not completely random, and that A′ = A. The ratio r between the
number of sequences obtained by pi and the number of sequences of
a perfectly random process is
r =
∏n
j=1(|A| − (j − 1))
|A|n
=
n∏
j=1
(1−
j − 1
|A|
) ≥ (1−
n− 1
|A|
)n
if we set k = |A|/(n − 1) then we have
r ≥ (1−
1
k
)1+|A|/k
if |A| >> n, |A| is big and n is small, also k is big (since it is
approximatively a nth fraction of A) and (1 − 1/k)k is approximable
by e−1, so
r ≥
1
e|A|/k2
6
but |A|/k2 = (n − 1)/k << 1. This means that r is not far from 1
(in the worst case, if A is comparable with k2, r is still bigger that e−1
or approximately 37%).
Theorem 1 Assume that A is large and n is small, as in the above analysis.
Given a password p ∈ An, and given a diagram d where all the letters in
A appear, it is possible to have a pi(d) of the same strength of p just taking
pi(d) ∈ An+1
Proof: Since in the worst case the ratio between the number of avail-
able sequences and the full set is only of e−1, this means that the gain
of a possible intruder is less than e times. Choosing a longer word, of
just two more bits, enlarges the password space by four times, negat-
ing the above speedup. Since A is large, by definition, it is enough to
add one single letter. 
By theorem 1, using pathwords does not imply to have longer
passwords, in the worst case, just one character longer.
3.2 An interface to a pathword system
It is not clear yet which is the better trade-off between the size of
the alphabet A, the size of passwords p and the best way to deploy
diagrams d.
Assume that d is a square matrix of 100 elements and that the
alphabet is composed of all the couples of digits (i.e. the alphabet of
the 100 “letters” ranging from 00, 01, . . . to . . . 98, 99).
Notice that to have a 64 bits password p, p must be at least ten
characters long. A pathword of length ten is not too complex to re-
member and can be even somethingwith very few structure in it, and
yet short enough to be remembered. Just to make a comparison, the
pathword of picture 3 is structured, the one 4 is less, the one 5 has
been randomly generated.
1 4 10
7
9 3
6 2
5 8
Figure 4: “Triangle-shaped”path
7
1 7
3 2
8
6 9
4
10 5
Figure 5: Random path
In the above example we have by explicit calculation that r ≈
63%. This means that it can be a realistic scenario. Notice that a 10 x
10 square table is not very big: it can be easily shown on a web page,
even on a PDA or printed on a sheet of paper of the size of a credit
card.
4 Discussion
The following are some question that naturally arise.
What happens if a user loses a pathword? And if it stolen?
If a user has just one single pathword, and if it is stolen or lost, this
can be a big problem, since an attacker will be able to access all the
users’passwords, just by reading them from the diagrams. If a user
had many pathwords, the loss is mitigated by the reduced number of
accessible passwords.
Comparing the loss of a password to the loss of a pathword, losing
the pathword is potentially worse, since it subsumes the simultane-
ous loss of many passwords.
Why should be easier to remember a pathword instead of a password?
It should be easier for two reasons:
1. a user should have few pathwords, instead of passwords by the
dozen,
2. humans are better suited to remember visual patterns than ran-
dom (i.e. structure-less) strings.
Is it not enough to keep passwords in a secure device — like a PDA with
some application — in some encrypted form?
Maybe. But notice that if a secure solution is available to manage
passwords, there should be no reason, in principle, for not using it
also to manage pathwords.
Having pathwords, instead of passwords, exposes the user to no
further risk, if the application is secure.
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Are passwords really not secure, in practice?
We are not aware of definitive conclusions on this issue, but some
previous works point out that:
• real passwords are not truly random and are exploitable with
brute force attacks,
• people reuse the same passwords, sometimes even for services
of different importance (for example, exposing the risk to have
their electronic bank account accessedwith the same credentials
used to post on a public web forum devoted to their hobbies),
• if people are forced to use really strong passwords, or to change
them frequently, they tend to write them down somewhere, de-
vising their own tricks to camouflage them,
• changing passwords is an issue: people tend to reuse two pass-
words, switching between them (i.e. having a summer pass-
word and a winter password), or to generate a new password
appending or changing some character to their previous pass-
word (i.e. passwordA, passwordB, and so on). Technical solu-
tions avoid these behaviours, but empirical evidence shows that
changing passwords frequently really annoys users.
Notice how pathwords address the above issues:
• passwords read from pathwords tend to be adequate,
• passwords are never reused: in fact, since a diagram can be gen-
erated by the service to be accessed, there is a practical guaran-
tee that no two diagrams are equal,
• the number of pieces of information that has to kept secret is
low, and so there is less pressure to deviseways of remembering
them,
• changing passwords can be an issue nomore: a service can even
change the password each time it is accessed, just by providing
the user with a different diagram each time.
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